On August 7th, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif flew to the Islamic holy city of Mecca to sign one of the most misinterpreted agreements of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan officially inaugurated a joint defense agreement that has been in the making for several years, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The agreement is neither a fully developed \u201cMuslim NATO\u201d nor a walk away from Washington. Its primary attempt is to build an autonomous regional deterrence framework. Its implementation will be determined by the three members’ willingness to adhere to the framework\u2019s main clauses, especially the collective defense. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The central provision of the Mecca Agreement is joint defense. It resembles the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\u2019s Article 5 which treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. The agreement comes against the backdrop of the US-Iran War, Israel\u2019s occupation of Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian territory, the IRGC\u2019s attacks against Gulf States, and shortcomings over U.S. protection of its allies in the region. Unlike NATO, the Mecca Agreement does not yet possess the North Atlantic organization\u2019s integrated command, joint planning, or collective military drills, making it depend on individualized political and military commitments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Middle East\u2019s security architecture has changed dramatically since Hamas\u2019s attack against Israel on October 7, 2023 and the unfolding events leading up to the ongoing US-Iran war. In light of these threats, regional states are adapting to the forming security architecture with active deterrence against two hostile actors in the region: Iran and Israel. First, the IRGC and its proxies missile and drone attacks presented the vulnerability of Gulf States, energy infrastructure and international shipping through the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb. Second, Israel\u2019s occupation of territory in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, its attack on Hamas\u2019s headquarters in Doha, Qatar, and its destabilizing effects of security in the region lead to such a hostile stance from the three members of the pact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, confidence in Washington has deteriorated. Gulf governments doubt when and under what conditions Washington will use its military might to protect its allies in the region. Another reason would also be Saudi Arabia\u2019s failed attempt of reaching a joint defense pact with the U.S.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All three members of the pact have very good relations with the current US administration. The pact itself falls within the American security umbrella in the Middle East. It could provide useful burden-sharing in military, maritime, and defense sectors. Washington will likely remain the major security partner but may lose being the region\u2019s exclusive strategic organiser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The agreement introduces a counterweight to Israeli military power in the region. The pact is likely to further complicate normalization between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. Israel could see this as a Sunni alliance against its regional aspirations. It has already labeled Turkiye as the \u2018New Iran\u2019 and it does not have diplomatic relations with Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The pact\u2019s immediate consequences are likely to be indirect for the country. Lebanon is not covered by its collective-defence provision, and no announced mechanism connects the agreement to the Lebanese Armed Forces or Hezbollah\u2019s disarmament. Its relevance would increase if Saudi Arabia and T\u00fcrkiye used the framework to coordinate military assistance, reconstruction funding or diplomatic support for the Lebanese state. Until then, claims that it could replace Hezbollah\u2019s deterrence remain speculative.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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