{"id":950,"date":"2026-06-25T10:28:28","date_gmt":"2026-06-25T10:28:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/?p=950"},"modified":"2026-06-25T10:28:31","modified_gmt":"2026-06-25T10:28:31","slug":"lebanons-fear-of-action-has-always-cost-it-more","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/lebanons-fear-of-action-has-always-cost-it-more\/","title":{"rendered":"Lebanon\u2019s Fear of Action Has Always Cost it More"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For decades, Lebanon\u2019s political and security establishment has treated the risk of confronting armed forces outside the state as more dangerous than the consequences of leaving them untouched.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">History proves the opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 1969, Lebanon was coerced into accepting Fatah\u2019s armed presence after it had become too great a problem for Jordan. The Lebanese Army, already reflecting the country\u2019s internal fractures, was \u201cpreserved\u201d from the risk of containing the spread of Palestinian and local militias that engulfed the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That chosen inaction not spare Lebanon from conflict. It helped create the conditions that drew both Syria and Israel into the country and condemned it to decades of war, occupation and tutelage. Eventually, the army too collapsed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Syrian control later persisted with American approval while Washington courted Hafez al-Assad. It ended only when the West\u2019s appetite for Damascus faded. By that time, Lebanon was too weak to mount a challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After Israel withdrew in 2000 and Syria in 2005, the weakened Lebanese state was violently forced to tolerate Hezbollah\u2019s parallel military order. Once again, the justification was stability: do not divide the army, do not provoke civil strife, do not risk internal confrontation.<br>The lesson is clear; avoiding the risk never protected Lebanon. It did not \u201cpreserve\u201d the unity of the army, it rendered it a purposeless bystander at best. It did not prevent violence. It did not stop foreign intervention. It simply allowed an internal armed problem to become a magnet for regional interference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Today, the risk is again clearly outlined. Yet the circumstances have changed. Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam are not weak heads of state, and the Lebanese Army is not incapable of following political direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Between the 2024 ceasefire and the six rockets of 2026, the Lebanese Army was again restrained from acting decisively against Hezbollah, supposedly to prevent domestic conflict. The result was not peace, but an external war that ravaged the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Today, Israel is likely to retain its occupation and freedom of action while Hezbollah remains armed. Syria is being pressured to intervene by Washington, carrying Ankara\u2019s influence and already naming its terms and conditions to the United States for playing a more active role vis-\u00e0-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The pattern is clear: when Lebanon refuses to resolve an armed challenge, foreign powers eventually exploit it at the expense Lebanon.<br>What more must the state wait for?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The risk of restoring sovereignty has always been overstated. The cost of refusing to do so has always been overwhelming.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For decades, Lebanon\u2019s political and security establishment has treated the risk of confronting armed forces outside the state as more dangerous than the consequences of leaving them untouched.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":951,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[31],"tags":[81,38,72,37],"class_list":["post-950","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-81","tag-38","tag-72","tag-37"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/950","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=950"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/950\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":955,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/950\/revisions\/955"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/951"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=950"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=950"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/polybloglb.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=950"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}