Lebanese policymakers persistently tend to envision Israel and the US as a single political actor. Whether one supports or opposes either side is fundamentally irrelevant; the premise is fixed. Tel Aviv and Washington are frequently approached as though they possess identical interests, objectives and calculations in the region.

However, history proves otherwise. Events which unfolded as a result of the US-Israel-Iran war uncovered harsh, yet strategic realities. While Washington seems steadily invested in ending military hostilities to prevent a wider regional conflict and restore stability, Israel remains firmly driven by long-term security concerns. However, framing this divergence as a rupture would be analytically misleading. The Israeli-US relationship remains one of the deepest structural alliances in history. Yet, this fact does not exclude room for possible disagreements.

For Lebanon, the fundamental question is not whether disagreements are present or not. Rather, it lies in Lebanese decision makers’ ability of building upon them. History offers an instructive example: During the pre-May 17 Agreement negotiations, Lebanese negotiators found themselves struck in front of a significantly more powerful Israeli counterpart. At first sight, the negotiations’ outcome seemed too obvious: Israel had already consolidated its territorial presence inside the country and enjoyed one of the closest relationships with the US (mediator back then). Israeli demands would obviously be met.

However, negotiations emerged in a more complex and unexpected manner. Archival sources reveal that the US role back then was not merely limited to transmitting Israelis’ demands, it constantly restrained them through direct intervention aligning with the Lebanese delegation on several occasions.

On the issue of Israel’s withdrawal from occupied land, American envoy Philip Habib unequivocally opposed the notion of a permanent Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. He repeatedly warned Defense Minister Ariel Sharon that a sustained Israeli occupation would eventually damage US-Israeli relations, successfully positioning Washington behind Lebanon’s demand for a complete withdrawal. The same applies to security arrangements.

While Israel favored options which would allow operational control over strategic locations such as the Baruk Mountain peaks, Habib rejected most Israeli demands moving closer to Lebanon’s sovereign-based position. General Andrew Cooley, one of Habib’s key advisers back then, went one step further defending the Lebanese Armed Forces and supporting the claim that the military institution was becoming increasingly representative and capable of imposing state authority. Perhaps most revealingly, Israeli leaders themselves acknowledged this dynamic. Sharon increasingly sought to limit Washington’s role during negotiations, believing that US engagement was serving Lebanese interests.

The importance of these events is often misunderstood. The lesson is not that the US suddenly became pro-Lebanese, because it did not. Nor is the lesson that Washington neglected Israeli demands, because it did not. The moral is that US and Israeli interests are not always identical. The US aimed toward regional stability, the maintenance of an operating Lebanese state, and the establishment of a comprehensive and sustainable diplomatic gain. On the other hand, Israel adopted a security-oriented approach which sometimes was perceived by American diplomats as politically unachievable and unrealistic. That deviation created a diplomatic vacuum. Lebanese negotiators grasped that reality. They understood that the US and Israel were not fungible actors. Most importantly, they realized that a small state’s leverage does not solely lie in its tangible capabilities to project power or overcome its adversaries, but by detecting divergences among great powers and building upon them. This surely reflects the most forgotten lesson of the May 17 Agreement. Present-day developments prove that this lesson is not simply “historical”. The recent trilateral framework signed between Lebanon, Israel and the US presents an up-to-date exemplification of a similar dynamic.

During recent negotiations, major disagreements allegedly surged regarding the sequencing and location of the initial pilot zones. While the Israelis sought to begin these pilot zones in areas outside their military control, the Lebanese delegation pressed that the process should start in areas under Israeli control. US mediation seems to have successfully bridged these differences. The final result, as advanced in the formal framework, incorporated Lebanese demands, with the first pilot zones covering regions under direct Israeli control; North and South of the Litani river. This achievement underscores a key reality: diplomacy can generate concrete and practical gains when a clear negotiating framework is set.

A similar logic applies on a broader security level for the past few weeks. US pressure and continuous diplomatic engagement seem to have been foundational in reaching a ceasefire; although fragile. Trump’s unconditional interest in ending regional military hostilities proved to diverge with Netanyahu’s maximum operational flexibility ambitions, both in Iran and Lebanon.

None of what was previously cited proposes a “rupture” in the US-Israel alliance. Rather, it underscores a deeper conclusion: when a strategic drift among allies surges, even slightly, windows can open for smaller actors. All too often, Lebanese hold pre-established perceptions toward external powers as if they act through unified blocs. The outcome is a passive diplomatic approach limited to merely reacting to political events or foreign decisions rather than shaping their outcomes. Nor the United States, neither any other country will support the Lebanese state out of sentimentality.

Therefore, Lebanon’s responsibility is not solely to wait for potential disagreements between Washington and Tel Aviv. Such divergences are already present, and will probably remain in the future. The tragedy of Lebanon has always lied in the state’s inability to recognize opportunities. Another window may be opening. The question is whether Lebanon is willing to walk through it, or once again watch it passively from the sidelines.