On August 25, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi stood at the Presidential Palace in Damascus to announce the organization’s official dissolution and formal integration into the Syrian Arab Republic. The dissolution came nearly 11 years after the SDF’s creation as an umbrella organization that brought together the Kurdish YPG/YPJ alongside Arab, Syriac-Assyrian, Turkmen, and other local factions to fight the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).

Since then, major changes across the Middle East have made the organization less beneficial and less significant to its main funder: the United States. The SDF will complete its dissolution after President Ahmad al-Sharaa issues presidential decrees appointing Abdi as a presidential adviser and Elham Ahmad as a deputy in parliament, while also meeting other demands, including Turkey’s removal of Abdi from its terrorism list.

The disarmament of the SDF and its formal integration into the Syrian state do not occur in a vacuum, but amid monumental changes that have altered the region’s geopolitical and security landscape. The primary reason for integration is that the SDF’s independent military status has become strategically unsustainable. Washington has shifted from sustaining the force to supporting the new government; Turkey has made continued Kurdish autonomy unacceptable; and Damascus has regained sufficient territorial control and diplomatic relevance.

What this means for Iran’s proxies

There is currently a US push toward the disarmament of militias across Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen; mainly Iran’s proxies. Although the SDF is US-backed, its dissolution could open the door to further militia disarmament across the region.

In Iraq, the government has set September 30 as the deadline for Iranian-backed militias to come under state control. In Lebanon, the government has already taken historic decisions to outlaw Hezbollah’s military wing amid a broader effort to restrict weapons to state security services. In Palestine, Hamas has agreed to full disarmament as per the outlined Gaza Peace Process Mechanism. The only outlier is the Houthi movement in Yemen. It does not want to join a state; it wants to create one.

The disarmament of Iran’s proxies also comes against the backdrop of accumulating US-Israeli pressure against the IRGC’s forward deterrence posture. The clampdown started after October 7, 2023 and has continued to this day with the US-Iran regional conflict. Iran’s regional model is coming to an end as the security architecture built around asymmetrical warfare has become obsolete.

For Hezbollah

Lessons from the SDF’s integration for Lebanon indicate that political dialogue is necessary, but it is not sufficient on its own. The Lebanese government’s approach for a gradual negotiated disarmament is the starting point, particularly given the risks that a forced confrontation with Hezbollah could generate. Yet Hezbollah’s hand over of its weapons depend mainly on its backer Iran. As long as Iran views Hezbollah as its instrument to project forward deterrence, Hezbollah will have little incentive or ability to surrender its weapons fully. Iran has to let go of Hezbollah so that Hezbollah can let go of its weapons.

The SDF’s dissolution clearly demonstrates that militias do not disappear when states demand it, but when the political, military, and regional conditions that justified their existence no longer hold. For Hezbollah, these conditions have strongly weakened but not yet disappeared. Its disarmament will depend on the expansion of the Lebanese Army’s role in filling Hezbollah’s security role, Iran’s reduced influence over the group, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.