In a February 6, 2025 article for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Associate Senior Policy Fellow Aslı Aydıntaşbaş quoted a senior Syrian opposition figure close to Ankara as saying: “Ahmad al-Sharaa understands Idlib is Idlib and Damascus is Damascus.” The remark captures part of the political logic behind al-Sharaa’s remarkable transformation. Al-Sharaa clearly understands that governing an isolated rebel enclave is fundamentally different from governing a fractured state seeking international recognition, investment, and stability. Al-Sharaa’s past includes leadership roles in jihadist movements, including al-Qaeda’s former Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. Yet since assuming national leadership, he has adopted a more pragmatic and internationally acceptable political posture—one that appears shaped not only by domestic necessity, but also by expectations of Syria’s external partners.

Ankara tops this list. It has been central to the evolution of Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its role in toppling the Assad regime. However, Ankara is not the only actor with leverage. The United States holds considerable influence over Syria’s international recognition and reintegration into the global financial system. Gulf states can finance reconstruction, while Israel presents a direct military and security challenge to al-Sharaa’s new rule. Iran, on the other hand, retains networks and interests it may still seek to control or protect. With all that in mind, a central question arises: who is shaping the terms on which the Syrian administration survives? Is al-Sharaa dependent on the same external actors now competing to define the country’s future?

The legacy he inherited

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa inherited many difficult crises from the former Assad regime. These include a devastated economy, fractured territorial control, a near-total loss of confidence in the Syrian state, and millions of displaced Syrians across the country and abroad. Other systemic problems include the entrenchment of foreign militaries and foreign intelligence services, as well as armed groups, and non-state actors.

With all the setbacks in mind, the Syrian state is unlikely to resolve them without foreign backing. The government’s immediate need for legitimacy makes foreign engagement almost unavoidable. Dependence on foreign actors, including Arab states and regional and international powers, can strengthen Syria’s position in handling these issues and open the door to investment, unity, and stability. However, this dependence should not evolve into control, or it will lead to yet another dark chapter in Syrian history.

The most immediate leverage

It is no secret that Ankara holds the greatest leverage over Damascus. The reasons are well known. In a June 10 article for New Lines Magazine this year, researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov quoted a Syrian official describing Ankara’s decision to back al-Sharaa’s offensive: “Once Turkey got the slightest impression that it would be different this time, the Turks said, ‘We’re with you, go all in.’” Turkey initially did not believe HTS would succeed, but once it believed that it could, it backed the movement more decisively.

The relationship between Ankara and HTS has had its ups and downs, but it has evolved significantly since HTS seized Damascus. During al-Sharaa’s first 19 months in power, the relationship has moved from mutual distrust toward mutual dependence. Al-Sharaa’s government remains tethered to Turkish security support, which has become essential to Syria’s domestic stability. However, while Turkey is well placed to benefit from reconstruction through its construction, trade, and industrial sectors, it lacks the capability to finance Syria’s economic transformation on its own.

The Gulf factor

Ankara’s financial shortcomings can be filled by the Gulf, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar has already provided financial support to the new Syrian state, including a 2025 program to help pay civilian public-sector salaries. This demonstrates the importance of Gulf capital to a government that requires immediate financial relief, public-sector support, and reconstruction funding.

Damascus has increasingly looked to Saudi Arabia as one of its principal Arab backers, partly to diversify its external dependencies beyond Turkey. In February 2026, Riyadh and Damascus signed a major package of investment agreements covering aviation, telecommunications, industry, and water infrastructure. This included a Saudi-backed fund to develop Aleppo’s airport infrastructure, the creation of the low-cost carrier Flynas Syria, and Saudi involvement in Syria’s electrical-cable industry. These agreements followed a July 2025 package of 47 Saudi-Syrian deals valued at USD 6.4 billion. Qatar has also signed major deals with the new Syrian government, including USD 7 billion MoU to build four gas-fired power plants and a 1,000 MW solar facility. This year, QatarEnergy joined an agreement to assess offshore gas exploration near Latakia. The UAE’s DP World also signed an USD 800 million agreement in July 2025 to develop Tartus port, including a multi-purpose terminal, industrial zones, and free-trade zones.

Financial assistance provides countries in the Gulf with significant leverage over al-Sharaa’s position within the Arab world. As these countries, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, draw closer to Turkey through the Muslim Brotherhood connection and the latest Mecca pact respectively, their influence is likely to further increase over the new Syrian administration.

On the other hand, there should not be any confusion about the differing political positions of the Gulf benevolent monarchies. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are part of the anti-Muslim Brotherhood alliance and seek to curb the expansion of political Islam in Syria. Qatar has long favored political-Islamist movements and is likely to fund political channels or movements that can uphold and preserve influence for actors aligned with their objectives.

Israel’s security considerations

Israel is negatively associated with Syria. Israel continues to treat al-Sharaa’s government with deep mistrust and suspicion, citing its Jihadist origins and expressing concern over Syria’s partnership with Turkey. From this point of view, Israel’s security considerations begin with its continued occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights (roughly 1,200 square kilometres) and its post-Assad military expansion into southern Syria. Estimates of the additional territory seized since December 2024 is around 600 to 800 square kilometres.

There is no credible intelligence that Israel aided al-Sharaa’s forces in toppling Assad. Israel’s actions since the fall of the Assad regime have instead focused on degrading Syrian military capabilities and maintaining military freedom of action in the south.

Al-Sharaa views Israel as a threat, but Damascus has nevertheless pursued a possible security arrangement that could eventually create a framework for an Israeli withdrawal from recently occupied Syrian territory. The United States has played a central mediating role in these discussions. Israel’s own concerns have also expanded beyond southern Syria. Its August strikes on Abu al-Duhur airbase followed Israeli claims that Damascus was preparing to allow Turkish troops to deploy near Aleppo, breaching an Israeli-Syrian security status quo. In essence, al-Sharaa’s calculations in southern Syria are shaped by Israel’s evolving military position, rhetoric, and occupation.

The gem of them all

The most important external actor to have reshaped its stance toward Syria is the United States. The Trump administration shifted Washington’s approach from isolation toward reintegration. This change removed the USD 10 million bounty on al-Sharaa in December 2024 after direct talks with him.

The Trump administration then opened direct engagement with the transitional government and treated Damascus as a potential partner. The United States ended its comprehensive Syria sanctions programme effective July 1, 2025, repealed the Caesar Act on December 18, 2025, with only retaining targeted sanctions on Assad-era figures, rights abusers, Captagon networks, ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, and Iranian proxies. On August 24 this year, it removed Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, where it had been designated since 1979.

Washington has tried to make the al-Sharaa government viable: economically by lifting barriers that strangled Syria’s recovery, politically by helping end its diplomatic isolation, and strategically by supporting a unified state. The United States wants Damascus to distance itself from terrorism, curb Iranian influence, cooperate against ISIS, and move toward a security arrangement with Israel.

Al-Sharaa’s calculus

The aforementioned layout provides each and every country with certain leverage over Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s administration but how does the president view those leveraged positions?

For Turkey, al-Sharaa is prioritizing Turkish security assistance, preserving Ankara’s political and security backing without becoming permanently subordinate to the Turkish interest.

For Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, al-Sharaa’s priority is turning those benevolent monarchies’ finances into reconstruction, and increasing state capacity, while diversifying partners beyond Turkey.

For the United States, al-Sharaa seeks to keep Washington invested in Syria’s post-war recovery, and reintegration within the international community without being labeled as a puppet for the West.

For Israel, al-Sharaa is doubling down on avoiding any military confrontation with the Israeli Defense Forces, preventing another open war on Syrian soil. 

In conclusion, we can remember Trump’s comments about al-Sharaa on November 6, 2025: “I think he is doing a very good job. It’s a tough neighborhood, and he’s a tough guy.”