It is no longer a matter of speculation. Lebanon’s foreign minister, Youssef Raggi, is being actively sidelined by Baabda and the Serail.

Think of every major foreign visit Lebanon’s heads of state have made in recent months—from Washington to Ankara, Doha to Rome, Baghdad to Damascus. Lebanon’s top diplomat is excluded from the story.

Sure, some of it may be excused, justified, or understandable. Joseph Aoun’s trip to DC was one such example. It was the president’s opportunity to shine, and he wasn’t expected to share it. The boost to his standing as a result of his successful meeting with Trump is, in political terms, a currency that he cannot be blamed for wanting to keep to himself.

Raggi’s absence from the Lebanon-Israel negotiation track is another major story where Raggi is better off being kept hidden. As a proud Lebanese Forces appointee to the government, his relationship with Moorab is a liability to the party and to the diplomatic track itself.

The optics of an LF-appointed minister negotiating with Israel are not the kind anyone (including Moorab) wants to taint themselves—or the negotiations—with.

But it does become increasingly indefensible from Salam and Aoun’s perspectives when Raggi is deliberately removed from Lebanon’s critical foreign trips entirely. And it undermines the value of the institution-building brand of Aoun and Salam’s mandates at a counterintuitive time for Lebanon.

So, what could possibly explain the thinking behind this apparent decision?

First, it would be hard to ignore the stylistic differences between the two state leaders and the hawkish LF minister. Raggi has less to take into consideration when it comes to managing dynamics—and thus has a wider margin than Aoun and Salam can afford.

Albeit popular, Raggi’s hardline stance on foreign diplomacy can prove too problematic for Aoun and Salam to balance within a more delicate set of considerations that they are forced to confront. These include domestic but also foreign actors. In such cases, Raggi can be perceived to act more in line with Moorab’s policy agendas and at times populist attitudes than with the diplomatic parameters set by Lebanon’s state leaders.

It’s also not easily deniable that Raggi did partake in implicit efforts that aimed to undermine President Aoun domestically and internationally, as part of a broader power struggle between Baabda and Moorab that emerged in the earlier days of Aoun’s presidency. It seems Joseph Aoun has not forgotten.

In an ideal world, a critical post like that of minister of foreign affairs may have been better occupied by someone just as principled as Minister Raggi, but without the attachment to a major party like the Lebanese Forces and the baggage that comes with it. The liabilities and limitations attached to Raggi’s proximity to Moorab have proved a net negative to both his work and the political cohesion between state leaders and their prime cabinet members.

This is especially so when we consider that Salam insisted on forming a government that excludes overt partisan alignments—something the LF’s ministers are particularly explicit about.

But in the long term, the status quo is unsustainable. It’s a bad look for Lebanon when its foreign minister is actively pushed to the side without convincing justification. Perhaps Minister Raggi can make an effort to accommodate the strategies set by Aoun and Salam rather than overstep them. But there has to be a better method to convey this message without outright ignoring Raggi and undermining Lebanese institutions in the process.